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Abstract. Due to the ability to overcome the geospatial limitations
and to the possibility to converge the various information communica-
tion technologies, the application domains and the market size of drones
are increasing internationally. Public authorities in South Korean are
investing for the domestic drone industry and the technological advance-
ment as a power of innovation and growth of the country. They are also
increasing the utilization of drones for various purposes.
The South Korean government ensures the security of IT equipment
introduced to the public authorities by enforcing policies such as security
compatibility verification and CCTV security certification. Considering
the increase of the needs of drones and the possible security effects to
the organization operating them, the government needs to develop the
security requirements during introducing drones, but there are no such
requirements yet.
In this paper, we inspect the vulnerabilities of drones by analyzing the
applications of commercial drones made by 4 manufacturers. We also
propose the minimum security requirements to resolve the vulnerabilities.
We expect our work contributes to the security improvements of drones
operated in public authorities.
Keywords: Drone · Security requirement · Application · Vulnerability
1 Introduction
A drone is a sort of small flying object without an onboard human pilot. It is
being adopted and operated to the broad area thanks to its characteristics such
as the efficiency to the human resource requirement and the ability to overcome
geographical limitations. The possibility to convergence with information com-
munication technologies, including data collection, transmission, processing, and
analysis allows continuous expansion of the applicability of drones.
A drone is mainly used to record video for reconnaissance, surveillance, man-
agement, and measurement by installing image collection equipment, but it is
also used as the flight vehicle for such as transportation and disaster prevention.
It is widely used for sports and leisure like racing, too. In 2018 PyeongChang
winter Olympic opening ceremony, it is adopted as the mean of the arts to project
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three-dimensional objects in the air by applying the cluster flight control and the
wireless communication technologies to drones. In the military domain, it is pos-
sible to be used as the weapon equipped guns or explosives on it and [1] showed
the effectiveness of the operation droned in the battlefield for surveillance.
As drone-related technologies are developed so that they can be used in
various fields, the demands of drones and the size of markets are also expanding.
According to [2], the drone market can be divided into commercial and military
applications. The global drone market combining the two sectors will grow from
$86.8 billion in 2015 to $143.9 billion in 2020, with an average annual growth
rate of 10.64 percent. Of the total, the global market for commercial drones will
reach about $63.1 billion in 2020 from $19.2 billion in 2016, with an average
annual growth rate of 34.6 percent.
As the growth of the size of commercial drone markets accelerates, it is ex-
pected that public authorities will also expand the introduction of commercial
drones that have functions and capabilities that are suitable for operating pur-
poses. The drones used in those areas require a higher security level as they have
to protect the public property and to maintain national security.
Advances in IT technologies increase the adoption of various equipment incor-
porating the latest technologies into public authorities at the same time require
the security of the equipment. When equipment containing security functions is
introduced to public authorities in South Korea, the security compliance verifi-
cation system is applied. Also, for the equipment which can result in extensive
security impact like CCTV, the public authorities are forced to introduce se-
curity verified products by the certificating authority applying the independent
security requirement. However, even though commercial drones are widely used
for security purposes so that the security impacts are high, there are no security
requirements except for the cryptography area that can be applied to drones
introduced in the public authorities.
In this paper, we propose the minimum security requirements that can be
applied when introducing commercial drones to public authorities. For this, we
analyzed vulnerabilities of the apps of four manufacturers’ commercial drones
and derived the requirements to prevent identified vulnerabilities.
This paper consists as follows. In section 2, we examine the researches related
to the vulnerability and the security requirements of drones. The vulnerabilities
of the commercial drones are analyzed in section 3, and security requirements
are proposed in section 4 after categorizing the types of vulnerabilities. Section
5 concludes this paper.
2 Related Works
2.1 Vulnerabilities of drones
A drone has consisted of a flight object and a controller. Considering the way
drones are operated such that the two components exchange data in remote
communication channels, expected vulnerabilities of them can be derived. [3]
and [4] categorized representative security vulnerabilities of drones as Table 1.
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Table 1: Types of vulnerability of drone
# vulnerability types
1 cipher key hacking after hijacking drone
2 neutralization of drone (e.g., GPS jamming)
3 information leaking
4 malware infection
5 loading unauthorized device
The drone may contain several vulnerabilities which cause each vulnerability
types. [5] and [6] found the vulnerabilities of AR Drone manufactured by Parrot
such as deauthorizations, remote command execution, and file tampering abusing
telnet and FTP service.
[7] discovered the vulnerabilities of U818A manufactured by Discovery whose
drones are widely re-branded as other manufacturers. The vulnerabilities include
weak authentication resulting account stealing, telnet account information ex-
tortion from the password file which is set inappropriate access control, and FTP
administrator privilege takeover by tampering the password file. What’s inter-
esting about the study is that using the Discovery drone’s controller app, they
were able to control at least 17 drones from other manufacturers controlled by
different apps. They identified three commonalities from those apps, including
fixed IP addresses set for the drone. From those findings, it can be assumed that
many manufacturers reuse drone control apps, and the same vulnerabilities are
contained in them.
There are studies of the risk assessment methodology specialized for drones.
[8] analyzed the drone hacking cases and indexed the risks in terms of confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability of drone’s communication channel, data storage,
sensor and error control component depending on the mission and the operating
environment to be performed by the drone. They assessed the risk by combining
the indices.
The previous studies related to the vulnerability of drones mainly focused
on the categorization of security vulnerabilities and the vulnerabilities held by
specific models, but it is hard to find studies that classify the vulnerabilities of
the drone by analyzing vulnerabilities of multiple drone models.
2.2 Security requirements of drones
We can find the literature of security requirements of drones from the study of se-
curity requirements standards and the Protection Profiles (PP) for the Common
Criteria (CC).
[3] and [4] are the organization standards of the security requirement of the
environment composed by a service provider utilizing drones and the consumers
of the service. The standards define 6 components of the drone-based service
system, including service requester, service providing organization, ground con-
troller, and drones. To prevent the security vulnerabilities of drones in Table 1,
4 D. Kim and H. K. Kim
the security requirements of each component and those of the interfaces between
them are proposed classified by compulsory and optional items.
[9] defined PP of drones for the CC certification. To develop evaluation crite-
ria which is the basis of PP, 1) 7 security threats and 3 assumptions are derived
from the drone attack scenario, 2) the security objectives are set to prevent the
threats, 3) 26 security functional requirements in 7 categories were developed to
fulfill each objective.
Although there are security criteria established based on assumptions, theo-
ries, and threat scenarios as the mentioned literature, it is rare to find studies
deriving security requirements based on the technical analysis of security vul-
nerabilities of drones. In this respect, the study is highly empirical.
3 Vulnerability Analysis of Drones
3.1 Targets
In this study, we analyzed security vulnerabilities in control apps for Android
operating systems of commercial drones from four manufacturers on the market.
Detailed information of the analysis targets is shown in Table 2. As in the table,
a single dedicated drone control app allows controlling several drone models
sold by a manufacturer. Thus, the security vulnerabilities of the drones analyzed
through the control apps in this paper may not only exist in a particular drone
model but may exist simultaneously in a variety of models.
Table 2: Detailed information of the analysis targets
manufacture country drone models control app app version
Syma China X5 series, X8 series SYMA FPV 5.2
Parrot France AR. Drone, BEBOP series AR FreeFlight 2.4.15
Yuneec China Typhoon series CGO3 0.1
UDI R/C China U29, U31, U47 UDIRC fpv 2.3
3.2 Methods
Static analysis and dynamic analysis of the apps were conducted to identify the
security vulnerabilities of the control apps.
The primary function of the control app is to provide a controller with func-
tions for drone control and data transmission. We set the objective of the static
analysis to identify vulnerabilities in data transferred between the controller and
the drone, in implemented services, and in the app itself.
If the behavior between the controller and the drone is analyzed in the dy-
namic analysis, different results can be produced depending on the model types.
Also, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the security vulnerability identifiable
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in the control app itself, not limited to the specific drone model. Thus, we set
the objective of the behavior analysis as identifying vulnerabilities in activities
between third-party web servers and the controller.
3.3 Results
Syma (SYMA FPV v5.2) A fixed IP address is assigned to the camera
attached to the drone as Figure 1 and no authentication is required to access
and to control it. This allows all devices belonging to the same network with the
camera can send and receive data to/from it.
Fig. 1: The static IP address of the camera in CameraManage.java
To make the interaction between the web service in the drone and the con-
troller, Common Gateway Interface (CGI) protocol which is the standard pro-
tocol to make the interaction between application programs and web servers is
used to transfer data. [10] found the vulnerability of the gateway in the home
network system, which is caused by CGI protocol. In the same way, the drone
manufactured by Syma also has the file named get params.cgi which stores the
account information and the configuration settings of the camera as well as the
several web service of the drone where the configuration setting can be modified
by the file named set params.cgi. The vulnerability arises due to the lack of ac-
cess control toward those files. Moreover, the plain text ID and password to be
used to access the drone is included in the query strings set to execute CGI files
as shown in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: The plain text user ID and password included in the query string to access
CGI file in ObtainBauRate.java
Parrot (AR FreeFlight v2.4.15) The crucial data stored in the mobile con-
troller is encrypted by the key generated by the initial value. However, since the
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initial value is exposed in the app which can be extracted by decompiling the
app as Figure 3, one can decrypt the stored data.
Fig. 3: The initial value to generate a password based encryption key in Acade-
mySharedPreferences.java
When logging in from the mobile app to the server of the manufacture and
modifying the personal information, various information is transferred in plain
text as the packet captured in Figure 4.
(a) parrot account of an user
(b) other accounts and user information
(c) user information
Fig. 4: Account and user information transmitted in plain text
For the user logged in to the manufacture’s server, an authentication string is
generated to check the right to execute the functions such as saving, modifying,
and deleting personal information. However, this string is generated by merely
composing the plain text username and password as in Figure 5 which can be
easily imitated.
Anonymous FTP and telnet services, known for their various vulnerabilities,
have been run on the drone to upload files and to execute remote commands as
shown in Figure 6. This can be exploited by an attacker to upload malware to
the drone and control it.
Yuneec (CGO3 v0.1) Similar to the case of Syma, the drone manufactured
by Yuneec also assigned a fixed IP, and various CGI command files are remotely
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(a) AcademyCredentials.java
(b) Academy.java
Fig. 5: (a) The authentication string composed by the simple combination of
username and password, (b) generating a user authorization credential using the
string to access a manufacture’s web server.
(a) FTPUtils.java
(b) FTPClient.java
Fig. 6: (a) Requesting a FTP connection, (b) generating the requested FTP
connection as an anonymous user
executable to control the camera and to exchange data between the controller
and the drone as captured in Figure 7.
FTP service is running on the controller to exchange files with the drone
where the username and the password to access the server are hardcoded in
plain text as Figure 8.
The path to get real-time video stream recorded by the drone-attached cam-
era and to access stored video file in it is hardcoded, and no access control method
is implemented to access the path as Figure 9 which allows the malicious capture
of the video.
Also, the IP address not accessed by the app as well as by the drone so
that the objective is unclear is included in the app as shown in Figure 10. This
address can be abused to lead unintended access to malicious external servers.
UDI R/C (UDIRC fpv v2.3) It was hard to conduct static analyze the
source code extracted by decompiling the app of UDI R/C’s drone because of
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(a) CGO3BaseRequest.java
(b) CGO3Command.java
(c) StartSendRequest.java
(d) StartRecordRequest.java
Fig. 7: (a) Base URL for CGI command, (b) sample CGI commands, and (c),
(d) examples composing full URL to execute CGI command
Fig. 8: The hard coded FTP server access ID and password in plain text in
FileSettings.java
(a) CGO3.java
(b) HttpRequest.java
Fig. 9: The address and the paths to access (a) video streams of a camera, and
(b) images stored on the drone
Fig. 10: The vague public IP address hard coded in HttpRequest.java
obfuscation technology applied to the app. However, we were able to find the
vulnerability characteristics of the drones manufactured by Discovery mentioned
in [7] by analyzing the behavior of the app.
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[7] discovered 17 different apps which can control Discovery’s drones where
the apps share the characteristics as below.
1. The IP address of the drone is fixed to 192.168.0.1
2. The unique string, 66808000808080800c0c99, is keep sent to 50000 port of
the drone using UDP
3. The commands to control the drone are sent to 7060, 8060, and 9060 ports
of the drone using TCP.
Figure 11 is capturing the characteristics the first two characteristics UDI
R/C drone is including and Figure 12 shows the last characteristic it has.
Fig. 11: The distinct string sent by UDP to 50000 port of 192.168.0.1
Fig. 12: The TCP connections to 7060 and 8060 ports of 192.168.0.1
[7] also discovered the vulnerability to intercept the video stream and the
stored information to the drone through 7060 and 8060 ports of it. It can rea-
sonably assume that UDI R/C drones also have the same vulnerability.
4 Proposing Security Requirements
4.1 Categorizing Types of Vulnerability
The vulnerabilities explained in section 3 is summarized in Table 3. Also the
types of vulnerability is categorized in Table 4 with corresponding vulnerabilities
in Table 3
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4.2 Security Requirements of The Commercial Drone
It may be possible to require to have high-security features, including electronic
warfare response capabilities and intrusion detection capabilities to all drones
introduced to public authorities. However, this would be unrealistic as it causes
substantial cost increases. It will also be difficult to equip many commercial
drones with advanced security features. Therefore we proposed the minimum
security requirements in Table 5 that the commercial drones introduced to public
authorities should fulfill to prevent the vulnerabilities listed in Table 4.
To prevent the vulnerability type V-1, it is necessary to identify authorized
users when authorizing control of the drone and when using critical functions
(#1). Additionally, the repeated access attempts to the drone that keep fails
should be restricted to avoid abnormal authentication trials (#2).
The critical information such as the account information and the encryption
key should be protected from exposure in the app to prevent the vulnerability
type V-2·3 (#3). Also, sensitive information transferred through the network
between the controller and the drone should be encrypted for confidentiality
(#4) using a secure algorithm (#5).
By prohibit unintended access to external servers, the vulnerability type of
V-5 should be protected. If necessary, access to the external network should be
limited using the white list access control mechanism.
The vulnerability types of V-1·2·4 are related to the malicious behaviors that
can be attempt while the drone is in operation. The simultaneous accesses to the
drone by multiple controllers should be prohibited to prevent such vulnerability
types.
To prevent the occurrence of V-4 type of vulnerability, it is essential to restrict
to provide services and to open ports which do not be explicitly recognized by
users in addition to proscribing executing the vulnerable application services
(#8). It should also be limited to the execution of arbitrary commands and
commands beyond permission even if the operator is authorized to access the
drone (#9).
5 Conclusion
In the future, the application of drones will be expanded further and will be com-
bined with various technologies to create synergy effects. In line with this trend,
public authorities will also expand the adoption of drones and prefer relatively
economical commercial products rather than through exclusively developed ex-
pensive products.
When drones introduced to public authorities lacks security, the damage is
evident to national property and information. However, if the drone has many
security features, such as electronic warfare capabilities and intrusion persistence
capabilities, it will be able to respond to various threats but will increase costs.
In this paper, we proposed the minimum security requirements that com-
mercial drones introduced and operated in public authorities regardless of their
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operating field and purpose by analyzing control apps of various commercial
drones.
We expect that this study promotes not only increasing security levels of
public authorities but also strengthening those of overall commercial drones.
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